Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release

William Novshek and Hugo Sonnenschein

Bell Journal of Economics, 1982, vol. 13, issue 1, 214-218

Abstract: This article studies the fulfilled expectations equilibrium for a Cournot duopoly model in which firms acquire information about uncertain linear demand. Several propositions are established concerning the incentives to acquire and release information in this duopoly environment.

Date: 1982
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (138)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%2819822 ... O%3B2-B&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:bellje:v:13:y:1982:i:spring:p:214-218

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://editorialexp ... i-bin/rje_online.cgi

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Bell Journal of Economics from The RAND Corporation
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().