The Theory of Economic Regulation
George Stigler
Bell Journal of Economics, 1971, vol. 2, issue 1, 3-21
Abstract:
The potential uses of public resources and powers to improve the economic status of economic groups (such as industries and occupations) are analyzed to provide a scheme of the demand for regulation. The characteristics of the political process which allow relatively small groups to obtain such regulation is then sketched to provide elements of a theory of supply of regulation. A variety of empirical evidence and illustration is also presented.
Date: 1971
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