FCC Regulation, Monopsony, and Network Television Program Costs

Robert W. Crandall

Bell Journal of Economics, 1972, vol. 3, issue 2, 483-508

Abstract: In this paper, a television program cost function is derived from a simple model of network rivalry based upon the Cournot postulate. This cost function is then fitted to data from a cross section of new network entertainment series for 1960-1965. The resulting estimates are quite unfavorable to two different aspects of FCC policy towards television broadcasting.

Date: 1972
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