Identical Bids and Cartel Behavior

William S. Comanor and Mark A. Schankerman

Bell Journal of Economics, 1976, vol. 7, issue 1, 281-286

Abstract: Despite wide acceptance of the view that identical bids suggest the presence of a cartel agreement, there has been little analysis of the role that such bids would play. When this matter is examined, we find that except in certain extreme circumstances, identical bid arrangements are unlikely to be maintained among colluding firms where their number in an industry is small. If this conclusion is correct, the focus of past government policy on the presence of identical bids as suggesting collusive behavior in highly concentrated industries is surely misplaced.

Date: 1976
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%2819762 ... O%3B2-N&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:bellje:v:7:y:1976:i:spring:p:281-286

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://editorialexp ... i-bin/rje_online.cgi

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Bell Journal of Economics from The RAND Corporation
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().