Cartel Pricing and the Structure of the World Bauxite Market

Robert Pindyck

Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, vol. 8, issue 2, 343-360

Abstract: A cartel is unstable if one or more of its members can earn higher revenues in the long run by undercutting the cartel price and expanding production. In this paper dynamic and static models of the world bauxite market are used to assess the stability of the International Bauxite Association, to suggest possible changes on the structure of the bauxite market and the future of bauxite prices.

Date: 1977
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