Comparative Static Properties of Regulated Airline Oligopolies

Richard Schmalensee

Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, vol. 8, issue 2, 565-576

Abstract: Airline regulation is assumed to fix fares and the number of competitors. Noncooperative schedule determination in a single regulated market served by a small number of carriers is analyzed. Comparative static effects of changes in cost and demand conditions, regulated fares, and numbers of carriers on rates of return, load factors, flight frequency, and excess profits are considered. The signs of important effects are either definite or depend simply on one or two observable magnitudes. Interpretations of the results are presented, and some implications for regulatory policy and future research are discussed.

Date: 1977
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