The New Soviet Incentive Model: Comment

Vinson Snowberger

Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, vol. 8, issue 2, 591-600

Abstract: This paper develops further the analysis begun by Weitzman and others of the new Soviet incentive system. Elaborating on the single-period model, it investigates the firm's reaction to uncertainty in the case of risk aversion, generalizes the treatment of the expenditure of effort, and introduces the possibility of multiple objectives. Turning to a two-period analysis, it begins the difficult study of the dynamic interaction between the planners and the firm in terms of the former's adjustment of future tentative targets according to past performance and the latter's reaction to this process.

Date: 1977
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