Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information

Victor P. Goldberg

Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, vol. 8, issue 1, 250-261

Abstract: This note is concerned with the effects of contractual complexity on the precontract bidding process. Competitive bidding is seen to be a heterogeneous class of devices for transmitting information between organizations. Even for rather simple contracts (e.g., Demsetz' license plates contract), the purchaser is seldom interested solely in price -- he is interested in acquiring and providing information as well. For complex contracts, such as a fifteen-year cable television franchise, the information problems tend to dominate. The implications of locating the liability for provision of precontract information on providers and on purchasers are considered.

Date: 1977
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