Rate Base Selection and the Structure of Regulation

Bruce C. Greenwald

RAND Journal of Economics, 1984, vol. 15, issue 1, 85-95

Abstract: This article investigates the role played by rate base valuation rules in the context of rate of return regulation. It shows (1) that there is nothing inherently "fair" about any particular valuation rule, (2) that properly interpreted rate bases represent promises of future returns, (3) that valuation rules can be "fairly" selected from a very broad class, and (4) that, once this is recognized, rate of return regulation represents a highly effective and flexible means of avoiding the "dynamic consistency" problems associated with repeated regulatory reviews. In addition, the article investigates the nature of "optimal" rate base valuation rules.

Date: 1984
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%2819842 ... O%3B2-U&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:spring:p:85-95

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://editorialexp ... i-bin/rje_online.cgi

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from The RAND Corporation
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().