Free Entry and Social Inefficiency
N. Gregory Mankiw and
Michael Whinston
RAND Journal of Economics, 1986, vol. 17, issue 1, 48-58
Abstract:
Previous articles have noted the possibility of socially inefficient levels of entry in markets in which firms must incur fixed set-up costs upon entry. This article identifies the fundamental and intuitive forces that lie behind these entry biases. If an entrant causes incumbent firms to reduce output, entry is more desirable to the entrant than it is to society. There is therefore a tendency toward excessive entry in homogeneous product markets. The roles of product diversity and the integer constraint on the number of firms are also examined.
Date: 1986
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