Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study

Carolyn Pitchik and Andrew Schotter

RAND Journal of Economics, 1988, vol. 19, issue 3, 363-388

Abstract: This article presents an experimental study of bidding behavior in sequential auctions in which there are budget constraints and perfect information. Our experiments test both the properties of such auctions and the predictive power of a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. We find that budget constraints affect the behavior of bidders and that the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is generally a good predictor of prices.

Date: 1988
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Working Paper: Perfect Equilibria in Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study (1986)
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