The Determinants of Board Composition
Benjamin Hermalin and
Michael Weisbach
RAND Journal of Economics, 1988, vol. 19, issue 4, 589-606
Abstract:
We identify factors that lead to changes among corporate directors. We hypothesize that the CEO succession process and firm performance will affect board composition. Our findings are consistent with both hypotheses. When their CEO nears retirement, firms tend to add inside directors (who may be possible candidates to be the next CEO) Just after a CEO change, inside directors with short tenures appear more likely to leave the board (they, perhaps, being the losing candidates). We also find that inside directors are more likely to leave the board and outside directors more likely to join after a firm performs poorly and when a firm leaves a product market.
Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:winter:p:589-606
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