Regulatory Options and Price-Cap Regulation
Tracy Lewis and
David Sappington
RAND Journal of Economics, 1989, vol. 20, issue 3, 405-416
Abstract:
We construct a simple model of the regulatory process in which a monopoly firm has private information about its capabilities and its cost-reducing activities. The optimal regulatory policy offers the firm a choice between two regulatory regimes, one of which resembles price-cap regulation. The other regime has the firm share realized gains in surplus with consumers. We examine the optimal linking of the two regimes and show how the optimal regulatory policy varies with changes in the technological climate in the industry and with the nature of the information asymmetry between regulator and firm.
Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)
Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%2819892 ... O%3B2-L&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:autumn:p:405-416
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://editorialexp ... i-bin/rje_online.cgi
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from The RAND Corporation
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().