Economics at your fingertips  

Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law

Suzanne Scotchmer and Jerry Green

RAND Journal of Economics, 1990, vol. 21, issue 1, 131-146

Abstract: The stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms. It also affects ex ante profitability of research. We compare weak and strong novelty requirements from the standpoint of social efficiency. We ask how our answer depends on the rule that determines which firm gets a patent when two firms have patents pending on the same technology. The possible rules are "first-to-invent," which applies in the U.S., and "first-to-file," which applies everywhere else.

Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (163) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) ... O%3B2-Q&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://editorialexp ... i-bin/rje_online.cgi

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from The RAND Corporation
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

Page updated 2019-12-07
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:131-146