The Role of Installment Payments in Contracts for Services

Tom K. Lee and Ivan Png

RAND Journal of Economics, 1990, vol. 21, issue 1, 83-99

Abstract: This article studies the role of installment payments in relationships characterized by moral hazard and sunk costs. We rule out vertical integration and payments contingent on the product of the contractor. Instead, each payment is negotiated as and when made. In such circumstances, an initial (down) payment serves to redress the weakness of the contractor in ex post renegotiations. If higher effort by the contractor in the first stage increases the marginal product of effort in the second stage, a second installment payment induces the contractor to invest greater effort initially.

Date: 1990
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