Reversions of Excess Pension Assets after Takeovers
Jeffrey Pontiff,
Andrei Shleifer and
Michael Weisbach
RAND Journal of Economics, 1990, vol. 21, issue 4, 600-613
Abstract:
This article evaluates pension asset reversions as a source of takeover gains. In our sample of 413 takeovers, pension funds were reverted by 15.1% of acquirers in the two years following hostile takeovers compared to 8.4% in the two years following friendly takeovers. Reversions following takeovers tend to occur in unit-benefit plans, where the potential for wealth transfer is the greatest. These results are consistent with the view that hostile takeovers breach implicit contracts between firms and employees. We estimate that the reversions can on average explain approximately 11% of the takeover premium in cases where they actually occur. Reversions are too small to be the sole, or even dominant, source of takeover gains.
Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)
Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%2819902 ... 3B2-%23&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:winter:p:600-613
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://editorialexp ... i-bin/rje_online.cgi
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from The RAND Corporation
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().