Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: An Explanation for "Unfair" Plea Bargains

Bruce Kobayashi ()

RAND Journal of Economics, 1992, vol. 23, issue 4, 507-517

Abstract: This article examines plea bargaining where there are multiple defendants facing a prosecutor. The prosecutor's optimal offer to each defendant is shown to depend upon the following two factors: (i) the defendant's ex ante probability of conviction, and (ii) the defendant's ability to increase his co-conspirator's probability of conviction. Furthermore, if the ex ante probability of conviction is positively correlated with a defendant's ability to raise his co-conspirator's probability of conviction, a plea bargain that gives the most culpable defendant the lowest penalty can maximize deterrence.

Date: 1992
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