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Electoral Support and the Capture of Legislators: Evidence from North Carolina's Vote on Radioactive Waste Disposal

Dennis Coates

RAND Journal of Economics, 1995, vol. 26, issue 3, 502-518

Abstract: Empirical tests of Stigler's (1971) "theory of economic regulation" using roll-call voting of legislators have ignored Stigler's hypothesis that secure legislators behave differently from insecure legislators. In this study of legislator voting on the Southeast Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact in North Carolina, the extent to which legislators' votes "represent" the economic interests of their geographic constituencies is significantly influenced by the support they expect to receive in reelection campaigns. Moreover, there is weak evidence in favor of Stigler's supposition that more secure legislators are more likely to vote the general interest than are their less secure colleagues.

Date: 1995
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