Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies

Francis Bloch

RAND Journal of Economics, 1995, vol. 26, issue 3, 537-556

Abstract: The formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two-stage noncooperative game. In the first stage, firms form associations in order to decrease their costs, and in the second stage they compete on the market. Examples of associations include R&D joint ventures and groups of firms adopting common standards. In equilibrium, the associations formed exhibit two general features: they are asymmetric and inefficient.

Date: 1995
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