If OSHA Is So Bad, Why is Compliance So Good?

David Weil

RAND Journal of Economics, 1996, vol. 27, issue 3, 618-640

Abstract: Since its inception more than twenty years ago, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has been the subject of an intense public debate on its effectiveness. This article analyzes the determinants of establishment-level compliance with specific safety and health standards as a means of assessing the agency's effectiveness. The empirical results suggest that OSHA has had large impacts on business compliance behavior, despite its low regulatory profile. These results indicate that government regulatory agencies can substantially change private-sector behavior, even given limited regulatory resources.

Date: 1996
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