Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations
Pierre Regibeau () and
RAND Journal of Economics, 1996, vol. 27, issue 1, 60-83
Innovators who have made significant breakthroughs may be tempted to get a head start in developing the applications of a new discovery before commercializing any new product. We consider how this socially undesirable waiting period and the pattern of development of subsequent innovations are affected by two patent protection regimes which we call "length" and "scope" protection. Our main finding is that the scope of the patent, and not its length, is the dimension that should be used to induce early disclosure of fundamental innovations while still preserving firms' incentive to do R&D. Furthermore, the optimal protection increases with rivalry in the markets for applications.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (77) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%2819962 ... O%3B2-D&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:randje:v:27:y:1996:i:spring:p:60-83
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://editorialexp ... i-bin/rje_online.cgi
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from The RAND Corporation
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().