Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions

Alan Beggs and Kathryn Graddy ()

RAND Journal of Economics, 1997, vol. 28, issue 3, 544-565

Abstract: We study the order of sale in art auctions. The final bid relative to the auctioneer's estimated price declines throughout the course of an auction. A theoretical model shows that in an auction ordered by declining valuation, even in the presence of risk-neutral strategic bidders, the price received relative to the estimate for later items in an auction should be less than the price relative to the estimate for earlier items. Furthermore, ordering heterogeneous items by value maximizes revenue for the auctioneer.

Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions (1996)
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