Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases
Claude Crampes () and
Corinne Langinier ()
RAND Journal of Economics, 2002, vol. 33, issue 2, 258-274
A patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified. The patentholder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement. His reaction may be to go to court, to settle, or to accept entry. We investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision. In a simultaneous game, even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high, the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial. The likelihood of entry may increase with the penalty. In sequential games, regardless who plays first, entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game.
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