The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions
Patrick Bajari and
RAND Journal of Economics, 2003, vol. 34, issue 2, 329-55
Internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce. We examine a unique dataset of eBay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior. We first document a number of empirical regularities. We then specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on eBay. Using our parameter estimates from this model, we measure the extent of the winner's curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.
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Working Paper: Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:randje:v:34:y:2003:i:2:p:329-55
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