Competition and Disclosure Incentives: An Empirical Study of HMOs

Ginger Zhe Jin ()
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Ginger Zhe Jin: University of Maryland

RAND Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 36, issue 1, 93-112

Abstract: I examine health maintenance organizations' (HMOs) voluntary disclosure of product quality, which is not as complete as unravelling theories predict. After controlling for cost and demand factors, I find that HMOs use voluntary disclosure to differentiate from competitors, with lower disclosure rates in highly competitive markets. These findings are consistent with product differentiation, but they challenge the intuition that competition should lead to more provision of quality information.

Keywords: Analysis of Health Care Markets Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility Differentiation; HMO; Health; Product Differentiation; Product Quality; Quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:1:p:93-112

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