Mergers Under Entry

Martin Pesendorfer

RAND Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 36, issue 3, 661-679

Abstract: I study merger incentives in a dynamic model under the presence of gradual entry. I consider a repeated game with merger decisions in every period and characterize the set of equilibria. I establish two properties: (i) a merger for monopoly may not be profitable; (ii) a merger in a nonconcentrated industry can be profitable. I illustrate the merger welfare implications in the Cournot model.

Date: 2005
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