The link between transparency and independence of central banks

Eleftherios Spyromitros

Journal of Risk & Control, 2014, vol. 1, issue 1, 51-60

Abstract: This paper, using a standard model of monetary delegation, highlights the relationship between transparency and conservativeness of central banks. Precisely, we show that a lack of transparency about the output objective of central banks positively affects the optimal degree of conservativeness of the central bank. Empirical analysis confirms the theoretical link highlighted in this study.

Keywords: Central bank independence; conservatism; transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rmk:rmkjrc:v:1:y:2014:i:1:p:51-60

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