Wir-Absichten in der individualistischen Sozialontologie

Axel Buehler ()
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Axel Buehler: Heinrich-Heine-Universitaet Duesseldorf

Rationality, Markets and Morals, 2009, vol. 0, issue 5

Abstract: An individualistic social ontology attributes mental states merely to individuals, and denies the existence of collective attitudes such as we-intentions. Furthermore, if collectives cannot be bearers of minds, then collective mental states cannot serve as explanatory factors. In my paper, I first show that we-intentions do serve considerable explanatory purposes within developmental psychology. I then propose an account of weintentions as complexes of intentions of different individuals. These intentions are of a distinct kind: de-re-intentions, grounded in external objects in a specific situation. This grounding is achieved by embodied cognition, through appropriate senso-motoric activities. I conclude that my account of we-intentions is compatible with an individualistic social ontology.

Keywords: we-intentions; we-intention; collective intentionality; collective attitudes; methodological individualism; individualism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rmm:journl:v:0:y:2009:i:5

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