Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science Part 2: Shallow versus Deep Explorations

Deborah Mayo ()
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Deborah Mayo: Virginia Polytechnic and State University Blacksburg

Rationality, Markets and Morals, 2012, vol. 3, issue 56

Abstract: Inability to clearly defend against the criticisms of frequentist methods has turned many a frequentist away from venturing into foundational battlegrounds. Conceding the distorted perspectives drawn from overly literal and radical expositions of what Fisher, Neyman, and Pearson ‘really thought’, some deny they matter to current practice. The goal of this paper is not merely to call attention to the howlers that pass as legitimate criticisms of frequentist error statistics, but also to sketch the main lines of an alternative statistical philosophy within which to better articulate the roles and value of frequentist tools.

Keywords: philosophy of science; philosophy of statistics; decision theory; likelihood; subjective probability; Bayesianism; Bayes theorem; Fisher; Neyman and Pearson; Jeffreys; induction; frequentism; reliability; informativeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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