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Bankruptcy in 2000s: instrument of the raiders to the "double standard" policy

Elena Apevalova and Alexander Radygin
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Elena Apevalova: Governmential Academy of National Economy

Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, 2009, vol. 4, 91-124

Abstract: The role of bankruptcy in a market economy and is well known in many aspects (both positive and negative) is described in the extensive literature. The threat of bankruptcy the corporation with erroneous policy managers in the markets (in the most hard version of the transfer of control to the creditors) standard is considered as an external corporate governance tool. The obvious anticipated result of the application of such a mechanism (regardless of the pros and cons of country-specific models - procreditor or prodolzhnikovyh) should be improvement of finances and improving the efficiency of the corporation, which has become the subject of appropriate procedures. In principle, all models banrotstva are in between the two extreme groups, focused on the debtor (USA, France) and the lender (UK, Germany).

Keywords: Bankruptcy; double standards; raiders; bankruptcy models; debtor; lender (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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