Coordination and Distribution Effects of I and II Types of Errors

Andrey Shastitko

Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, 2011, vol. 1, 11 pages

Abstract: It was demonstrated how costs of rights enforcement and redress, as well as errors types I and II regarding rules enforcement influence on equilibrium properties and benefits distribution among game participants, including third-party enforcer. It was presented how discrimination on the side of external enforcer influences on game participants strategy choice and game results in terms of equilibrium and benefits distribution.

Keywords: antitrust; law and economics; errors types I and II; external enforcer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rnp:ecopol:11111

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