Antitrust, Legislation Clearness and Judicial Precedent

Alexander Vereshchagin ()
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Alexander Vereshchagin: University of Essex

Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, 2011, vol. 1, 6 pages

Abstract: The article examines judicial precedent as a means to improve the predictability of antitrust regulation. The author concludes that this remedy is not effective enough because of the uncertainty inherent to this regulation.

Keywords: antitrust; law and economics; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rnp:ecopol:11115

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