The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract

Oliver Williamson

Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, 2009, vol. 6, 111-134

Abstract: Assumptions about the importance of the organization and the possibility of studying for a long time economists have greeted with skepticism. Of course, there were the happy exceptions, such as in the works of Alfred Marshall, Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich Hayek. In favor of the importance of the organization expressed equally and representatives of economic institutionalism (Thorsten Veblen, John Commons and K. Ronald Coase), and representatives of the organization theory (Robert Michelz, Chester Barnard, Herbert Simon, James March and Richard Scott).

Keywords: firm; governance; structure; institutionalism; contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Journal Article: The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract (2002)
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