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Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe’s Fiscal Union

C. Randall Henning and Martin Kessler
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Martin Kessler: Peterson Institute for International Economics

Economic Policy, 2012, vol. 6, 31 pages

Abstract: This essay on US fiscal federalism builds on the established tradition. But unlike many papers that take current US features as a given, the authors tell us what present arrangements governing responsibility over public debt gradually emerged from, and why. By bringing in the historical dimension and the trial-and-error process that took place over more than two centuries, they help us understand the logic behind alternative arrangements and why the current one has in the end prevailed.

Keywords: fiscal federalism; USA; public debt; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: Fiscal federalism- US history for architects of Europe's fiscal union (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe's Fiscal Union (2012) Downloads
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