Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe’s Fiscal Union
C. Randall Henning and
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Martin Kessler: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Economic Policy, 2012, vol. 6, 31 pages
This essay on US fiscal federalism builds on the established tradition. But unlike many papers that take current US features as a given, the authors tell us what present arrangements governing responsibility over public debt gradually emerged from, and why. By bringing in the historical dimension and the trial-and-error process that took place over more than two centuries, they help us understand the logic behind alternative arrangements and why the current one has in the end prevailed.
Keywords: fiscal federalism; USA; public debt; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Fiscal federalism- US history for architects of Europe's fiscal union (2012)
Working Paper: Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe's Fiscal Union (2012)
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