 Agency relations: Russian person (Russia - a country of amateurs?)Dmitrij Zhdanov ()
Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, 2013 Abstract: Domestic agency relations developing between the principal and their hired heads, inherit a set of distinctive features associated with the lack of well-established corporate institutions, closure of business, significant influence of specific intangible assets, which is, however, also characteristic of other transition countries. In the present article we present the results of surveys of students at the Presidential Academy of the Russian business executives dedicated to the study of the nature of these relationships in Russian firms. Based on the study offered a model description of identified dependencies, the concept of utility managers and its dependence on the skills and loyalty of the agent, provides guidance on the selection of managers, as well as the rationalization of the organization of the holding type corporations. Keywords: agency relationship; the selection and hiring of top managers; qualification; loyalty and utility of executives; modeling; organizational structure of the corporation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1339 Access Statistics for this article Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy is currently edited by Vladimir Mau More articles in Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy from Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Contact information at EDIRC. |
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