The program of exemption from punishment in antitrust policy: empirical assessment of the problem

Guzel Yusupova ()

Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, 2013, 143—160

Abstract: The influence of program of exemption from punishment (PEP) on the stability and the duration of the cartels enhances the effectiveness of the work as a competition authority, and antitrust policy in relation to agreements restricting competition in general. The results of the synthesis and critical analysis of empirical research on the factors of the PEP efficiency in Russia and abroad show the effect of changing the rules on the behavior of market participants. However, the methodology for assessing the effectiveness of PEP remains a debatable issue. The purpose of this work is to summarize the methods of empirical assessment to the effects of PEP.

Keywords: program of exemption from punishment; PEP; horizontal agreements; antitrust policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.ranepa.ru/rnp/ecopol/ep1369.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1369

Access Statistics for this article

Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy is currently edited by Vladimir Mau

More articles in Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy from Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RANEPA maintainer ().