Was there a collusion? (Once again on the monopolistically high prices of Russian oil companies)
Был ли молчаливый сговор? Еще раз о монопольно высоких ценах российских нефтяных компаний
Guzel Yusupova () and
Kiseleva, Olga (Киселева, Ольга) ()
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Kiseleva, Olga (Киселева, Ольга): New school of economics
Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, 2015, vol. 4, 178—195
Abstract:
Legal structure "abuse of collective dominance" corresponds to the behavior of companies, well-known economist as a "tacit collusion": the interdependence of the sellers makes it profitable for them to maintain high prices even in the absence of an explicit agreement between them. For the Russian market, which are attended by the major oil companies, characterized by factors that really facilitate tacit collusion. However, the analysis showed that even in times of an alleged violation of antitrust laws (purpose monopolistically high prices as the abuse of dominant position), the actual prices of sellers may not correspond to the model of tacit collusion.
Keywords: abuse of collective dominance; market power; collusion; the Russian market of petroleum products (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1549
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