Complementarietà tra istruzione e investimenti in training delle imprese: alcune interpretazioni teoriche

Maria De Paola () and Vincenzo Scoppa ()

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2002, vol. 92, issue 5, 97-126

Abstract: A large empirical evidence shows that on-the-job training paid by firms is mainly directed towards high educated workers. In order to explain this phenomenon, we propose two simple models adopting the assumption that education has a positive influence on the efficiency with which individuals acquire new skills. The first one considers an adverse selection mechanism which affects mainly high-educated workers. This compresses their wage structure, encouraging firms to train them. The second model starts from the assumption that high-educated workers are more involved in team production, which generates team specific human capital, reduces their turnover, increasing training investments by firms.

JEL-codes: J24 J31 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:92:y:2002:i:5:p:97-126

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