Endogenous Lobbying in Search of Import Protection

Wolfgang Mayer () and Sudesh Mujumdar
Additional contact information
Wolfgang Mayer: University of Cincinnati, USA
Sudesh Mujumdar: University of Southern Indiana, Evansville, Indiana, USA

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2003, vol. 93, issue 1, 119-148

Abstract: This paper examines the general-equilibrium effects of declining import prices on import and export industries’ lobbying. Different from the existing literature, our model endogenizes the emergence of lobbying groups, as lobbying requires both money to “buy access” to policymakers and management time to utilize it. A decline in the import good’s world price leads to an immediate rise in lobbying by the import industry. Over time, however, this initial lobbying surge diminishes and lobbying might become less than before the price fall. The export industry lobbies more over time in spite of benefiting from a higher relative price.

JEL-codes: F10 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.rivistapoliticaeconomica.it/2003/genfeb/mayer.php
Payment required

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:93:y:2003:i:1:p:119-148

Access Statistics for this article

Rivista di Politica Economica is currently edited by Gustavo Piga

More articles in Rivista di Politica Economica from SIPI Spa
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sabrina Marino ().