The Power of Specialization: How Interest Groups Influence EU Legislation

Gerald Schneider () and Konstantin Baltz ()
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Gerald Schneider: University of Konstanz
Konstantin Baltz: University of Konstanz

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2003, vol. 93, issue 1, 253-288

Abstract: This article lends strong support to Mancur Olson´s assertion that large power asymmetries between competing interest groups typify public policy making. We examine one particular phase in the decision making process within the European Union, namely the domestic prenegotiations on legislative proposals of the Commission. Our regression analysis demonstrates that “privileged” or specialized producer and consumer groups are able to stir the outcome into their preferred direction during this crucial bargaining process. While general consumer interests remain most often powerless, general producer interests exert influence in two of the four EU member states under examination

JEL-codes: D72 D78 F15 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:93:y:2003:i:1:p:253-288

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