Trading Interests: Legislature Size, Constituency Size and Government Spending in a Panel of Countries

Roberto Ricciuti

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2003, vol. 93, issue 1, 315-

Abstract: In this paper we study the relationship between legislature size and constituency size with respect to government spending. According to the theory, legislature size has an indefinite effect on government spending because logrolling and transaction costs may have cancelling effects. In turn, smaller constituency size is predicted to decrease government spending, because of homogeneity of interests and low monitoring costs. We use a panel of 23 OECD countries over the period 1975-1996 controlling for some institutional features that differ among these countries. We find that legislature size outperforms constituency size in explaining government spending. Consequences for lobbies’ behavior are drawn.

JEL-codes: H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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