Vote Buying Through Resource Allocation in a Government Controlled Sector

Morten Bennedsen ()
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Morten Bennedsen: Copenhagen Business School, CEBR and CIE

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2003, vol. 93, issue 1, 49-78

Abstract: Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition.

JEL-codes: D29 H11 H40 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:93:y:2003:i:1:p:49-78

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