The Strategic Choice of Contractual Policies

Alessandro Bonatti

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2003, vol. 93, issue 6, 167-190

Abstract: This paper is devoted at analyzing the strategic choice of intra-firm contractual policies in an oligopoly framework. It derives conditions under which a cooperative bargaining process between firms’ owners and employees characterizes a dominant strategy equilibrium of the game. It then extends the model to consider a different specification of the two parties’ outside options and the implications of the equilibrium allocation on social welfare and collusion possibilities.

JEL-codes: L13 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:93:y:2003:i:6:p:167-190

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