The Impacts of Voting Rules on Acceding EU Member States

Gregory Johnston (), Leonard Ray (), Scott L. Feld () and Bernard Grofman ()
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Gregory Johnston: Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (LA)
Leonard Ray: Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (LA)
Scott L. Feld: Purdue University, est Lafayette (IN)
Bernard Grofman: University of California, Irvine (CA)

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2004, vol. 94, issue 4, 105-120

Abstract: We propose a framework by which to observe the consequences of enlargement of the European Union. We outline the sincere positions of the old and new EU members, using a one-dimensional spatial model to predict a range of stable policy outcomes under two proposed sets of voting rules: qualified majority voting (QMV), and a dual majority requiring a majority of the members states encompassing 60% of the EU's population. We show that the positions of the ten joining countries tend to fall outside of the range of stable outcomes under QMV, and even more so under the dual majority rule.

JEL-codes: D02 D72 D78 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:94:y:2004:i:4:p:105-120

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