A Schumpeterian Model of Wage Inequality and Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement
Carmelo Parello () and
Luca Spinesi ()
Rivista di Politica Economica, 2005, vol. 95, issue 5, 151-176
This paper addresses the concern of whether the determinants of patent infringement and declaratory judgement suits may affect both long-term economic performance and wage inequality. In doing so, we construct a quality-ladder R&D-based endogenous growth model, in which the institutional setting for patent protection directly impacts the long-run private incentive to conduct R&D as well as to invest in human capital. We find that both the institutional setting and the Court's behaviour exacerbate wage inequality, while the steady-state effects on R&D effort and long-run growth are mixed.
JEL-codes: F10 F12 L16 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:151-176
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