Are Patent Litigation Insurances Fit for the Dynamics of Innovation?

Christian Ben Lakhdar ()

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2005, vol. 95, issue 5, 69-90

Abstract: Patent insurance policies allow firms to externalise the legal cost in case of conflicts. These litigation insurances may incite innovators to sue more often, which would increase the social cost of litigation. By modelling a patent file, we show that these patent litigation insurances incite innovators to claim for wider breadth patent too. Wider breadth patents could lead to an increased number of legal conflicts but could also lead to a slackening in the process of innovation improvement. We come to the conclusion that the effects of these insurance schemes on the welfare are really indeterminate.

JEL-codes: G22 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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