Proprietary Information Protection and the Long-Run Implications of Industrial Espionage
Carmelo Parello ()
Rivista di Politica Economica, 2005, vol. 95, issue 5, 91-124
This paper deals with proprietary information and industrial espionage. To obtain this goal, an innovation-based growth model is constructed where R&D employment is split into two types of researchers: inventors and spies. The paper provides an analysis of the steady-state effects of better enforcement of proprietary information protection in terms of a change of the institutional set-up devoted to intellectual property rights and private information protection. We find that there is only a temporary positive impact on the innovation rate, while there is permanent negative effect on the steady-state rate of spying and nominal wage.
JEL-codes: D9 K4 L5 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:91-124
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