Why Do Transparent Public Procurement and Corruption Go Hand in Hand?

Raffaella Coppier () and Gustavo Piga
Additional contact information
Raffaella Coppier: Università di Macerata

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2006, vol. 96, issue 1, 185-206

Abstract: In this paper we try to construct an hypothesis as to why, as data seem to show, countries that adopt more "transparent procurement", as calculated by the share of tender advertised publicly, are also the ones where corruption is considered more pervasive. We describe an economy where in equilibrium countries more prone to corruption find it optimal to increase transparency more to curb corruption itself. However, as transparency is costly to implement, this will not be enough to bring corruption levels to those of inherently less corrupt societies. We finally suggest alternative ways to reduce corruption in procurement.

JEL-codes: H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.rivistapoliticaeconomica.it/2006/gen-feb/coppier.php
Payment required

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:96:y:2006:i:1:p:185-206

Access Statistics for this article

Rivista di Politica Economica is currently edited by Gustavo Piga

More articles in Rivista di Politica Economica from SIPI Spa
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sabrina Marino ().