Environmental Issues in Public Procurement: How Much Decentralization?

Alessio D'Amato ()

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2006, vol. 96, issue 1, 209-234

Abstract: Concerns about the environmental effects of procurement decisions are gaining momentum. We investigate how the environmental quality of public purchases changes under two possible institutional settings: a centralized one, where a single regulator is in charge of both production efficiency and environmental quality, and a decentralized one, where two separate bodies operate, namely an environmental agency securing environmental quality and a procurement agency pursuing efficiency. Informational asymmetries that affect such regulatory relationship are taken into account. We conclude that, under certain conditions, non-cooperation tightens the trade off between incentives to efficiency and rent extraction, resulting in a downward distortion in environmental quality.

JEL-codes: D82 L51 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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