Optimal Information Releasing in Multidimensional Public Procurement

Nicola Doni ()

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2006, vol. 96, issue 1, 235-

Abstract: In this paper we analyse a multidimensional auction where quality scores are private information of the Public Administration (PA). We introduce a multistage procedure: in the first stage every participant submits a technical proposal, without knowing what the buyer evaluation is. In the second stage every bidder proposes a price. We investigate the best strategic use of the PA's information comparing three different policies: a) secrecy b) private revelation c) public revelation. We show that only the second one is able to achieve allocative efficiency. At the same time, generally, this strategy is associated with a lower PA's expected utility.

JEL-codes: D44 D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:96:y:2006:i:1:p:235-

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